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Abstract—This paper considers a scenario in which a source-
destination pair needs to establish a confidential connection
against an external eavesdropper, aided by the interference
generated by another source-destination pair that exchanges
public messages. The goal is to compute the maximum achievable
secrecy degrees of freedom (S.D.o.F) region of a MIMO two-
user wiretap network. First, a cooperative secrecy transmission
scheme is proposed, whose feasible set is shown to achieve all
S.D.o.F. pairs on the S.D.o.F. region boundary. In this way, the
determination of the S.D.o.F. region is reduced to a problem
of maximizing the S.D.o.F. pair over the proposed transmission
scheme. The maximum achievable S.D.o.F. region boundary
points are obtained in closed form, and the construction of
the precoding matrices achieving the maximum S.D.o.F. region
boundary is provided. The obtained analytical expressions clearly
show the relation between the maximum achievable S.D.o.F.
region and the number of antennas at each terminal.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, Cooperative communi-
cations, Multi-input Multi-output, Secrecy Degrees of Freedom.
I. INTRODUCTION
The area of physical (PHY) layer security has been pio-
neered by Wyner [1], who introduced the wiretap channel and
and the notion of secrecy capacity, i.e., the rate at which the
legitimate receiver can correctly decode the source message,
while an unauthorized user, often referred to as eavesdropper,
obtains no useful information about the source signal. For
the classical source-destination-eavesdropper Gaussian wiretap
channel, the secrecy capacity is zero when the quality of the
legitimate channel is worse than the eavesdropping channel
[2]. One way to achieve non-zero secrecy rates in the latter
case is to introduce one [3]–[8] or more [9]–[15] external
helpers, who transmit artificial noise, thus acting as jammers to
the eavesdropper. More complex K-user interference channels
(IFC) are considered in [16]–[19], where each user secures its
communication from the remaining K−1 users by transmitting
jamming signals along with its message signal.
From a system design perspective, introducing non-message
carrying artificial noise into a network is power inefficient
and lowers the overall network throughput. In dense multiuser
networks there is ubiquitous co-channel interference (CCI),
which, in a cooperative scenario could be designed to effec-
tively act as noise and degrade the eavesdropping channel.
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Indeed, there are recent results [19]–[24] on exploiting CCI
to enhance secrecy. [19]–[22] consider the scenario of a K-
user IFC in which the users wish to establish secure com-
munication against an eavesdropper. Specifically, [19]–[21]
consider the single-antenna case and examine the achievable
secrecy degrees of freedom by applying interference alignment
techniques. The work of [22] considers the multi-antenna case
and proposes interference-alignment-based algorithms for the
sake of maximizing the achievable secrecy sum rate. In [23],
[24], a two-user wiretap interference network is considered,
in which only one user needs to establish a confidential
connection against an external eavesdropper, and the secrecy
rate is increased by exploiting CCI due to the nonconfidential
connection. [23], [24] maximize the secrecy transmission rate
of the confidential connection subject to a quality of service
constraint for the non-confidential connection.
In this paper, we consider a two-user wiretap interference
network as in [23], [24], except that, unlike [23], [24], which
assume the single input single-output (SISO) case or multiple-
input single-output (MISO) case, we address the most general
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) case, i.e., the case
in which each terminal is equipped with multiple antennas.
Out network comprises a source destination pair exchanging
confidential messages, another pair exchanging public mes-
sages, and a passive eavesdropper. Our goal is to exploit
the interference generated by the second source destination
pair, in order to enhance the secrecy rate performance of the
network. We should note that, although the eavesdropper is not
interested in the messages of the second pair, for uniformity,
we will still refer to the rate of the second pair as secrecy
rate. Since determining the exact maximum achievable secrecy
rate of a helper-assisted wiretap channel, or of an interference
channel is a very difficult problem [3]–[17], we consider the
high signal to noise ratio (SNR) behavior of the achievable
secrecy rate, i.e., the secrecy degrees of freedom (S.D.o.F.) as
an alternative. A similar alternative has also been considered in
[19]–[21], [25]–[27]. Our main contributions are summarized
below.
1) We propose a cooperative secrecy transmission scheme,
in which the message and interference signals lie in
different subspaces at the destination of the confidential
connection, but are aligned along the same subspace at
the eavesdropper. We show that the proposed scheme
can achieve all the boundary points of the S.D.o.F.
region (see Proposition 3). In this way, we reduce the
determination of each S.D.o.F. region boundary point
2to an S.D.o.F. pair maximization problem over our
proposed transmission scheme.
2) We determine in closed form the Single-User points,
SU1 and SU2 (see eq. (40) and (41), respectively)
corresponding to when only one user communicates
information, the strict S.D.o.F. region boundary (see
eq. (48)), and the ending points of the strict S.D.o.F.
region boundary, E1 and E2 (see eq. (49) and (58),
respectively). Our analytical results fully describe the
dependence of the S.D.o.F. region of a MIMO two-user
wiretap interference channel on the number of antennas.
3) We derive in closed form the general term formulas
for the feasible precoding vector pairs corresponding to
the proposed transmission scheme, based on which we
construct precoding matrices achieving S.D.o.F. pairs on
the S.D.o.F. region boundary (see Table III).
The corner point of our S.D.o.F. region corresponding
to zero S.D.o.F for the nonconfidential connection has also
been studied in [25]–[27], wherein the maximum achievable
S.D.o.F. of a MIMO wiretap channel with a multi-antenna
cooperative jammer has been studied. Our corner point result
is more general because, unlike [25]–[27] it applies to any
number of antennas. It is interesting to note that although we
derive the achievable S.D.o.F. from a signal processing point
of view, our corner point result matches the S.D.o.F. result
of [25]–[27], which is derived from an information theoretic
point of view.
The idea of signal subspace alignment is also used in [28]–
[31] in the derivation of the D.o.F. of the X channel and the K-
user interference channel. Due to the difference in signal mod-
els, the motivation and use of subspace alignment is different.
In [28]–[31], the authors jointly design the precoding matrices
at the sources, which align multiple interference signals into
a small subspace at each receiver so that the sum dimension
of the interference-free subspaces remaining for the desired
signals can be maximized. In our work, we apply subspace
alignment for the sake of degrading the eavesdropping channel
and our goal is to maximize the dimension difference of the
interference-free subspaces that the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper can see.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce a mathematical background, i.e., generalized
singular value decomposition (GSVD), that provides the basis
for the derivations to follow. In Section III, we describe the
system model for the MIMO two-user wiretap interference
channel and formulate the S.D.o.F. maximization problem. In
Section IV, we propose a secrecy cooperative transmission
scheme, and prove that its feasible set is sufficient to achieve
all S.D.o.F. pairs on the S.D.o.F. region boundary. In Section V,
we determine the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. region bound-
ary, and uncover its connection to the number of antennas. In
Section VI, we construct the precoding matrices which achieve
the S.D.o.F. pair on the boundary. Numerical results are given
in Section VII and conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
Notation: x ∼ CN (0,Σ) means x is a random variable
following a complex circular Gaussian distribution with mean
zero and covariance Σ; (a)+ , max(a, 0); ⌊a⌋ denotes the
biggest integer which is less or equal to a; |a| is the absolute
value of a; I represents an identity matrix with appropriate
size; CN×M indicates a N ×M complex matrix set; AT ,
AH , tr{A}, rank{A}, and |A| stand for the transpose,
hermitian transpose, trace, rank and determinant of the matrix
A, respectively; A(:, j) indicates the j-th column of A while
and A(:, i : j) denotes the columns from i to j of A;
span(A) and span(A)⊥ are the subspace spanned by the
columns of A and its orthogonal complement, respectively;
null(A) denotes the null space of A; span(A)/span(B) ,
{x|x ∈ span(A),x /∈ span(B)}; span(A) ∩ span(B) = 0
means that span(A) and span(B) have no intersections;
dim{span(A)} represents the number of dimension of the
subspace spanned by the columns of A; Γ(A) denotes the
orthonormal basis of null(A); A⊥ denotes the orthonormal
basis of null(AH).
II. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
Given two full rank matrices A ∈ CN×M and B ∈
CN×K . The GSVD of (A,B) [32] returns unitary matrices
Ψ1 ∈ CM×M , Ψ2 ∈ CK×K and Ψ0 ∈ CN×N , non-negative
diagonal matricesD1 ∈ CM×k and D2 ∈ CK×k, and a matrix
Ω ∈ Ck×k with rank{Ω} = k, such that
AH = Ψ1D1
[
Ω−1 0
]
ΨH0 , (1a)
BH = Ψ2D2
[
Ω−1 0
]
ΨH0 , (1b)
with D1 =

 Ir 0 00 Λ1 0
0 0 0

, D2 =

 0 0 00 Λ2 0
0 0 Ip

, where
the diagonal entries of Λ1 ∈ Rs×s and Λ2 ∈ Rs×s are greater
than 0, and DH1 D1 +DH2 D2 = I. It holds that
k ,rank{[(AH)T , (BH)T ]T } = min{M +K,N}, (2a)
p ,dim{span(A)⊥ ∩ span(B)} = k −min{M,N}, (2b)
r ,dim{span(A) ∩ span(B)⊥} = k −min{K,N}, (2c)
s ,dim{span(A) ∩ span(B)} = k − p− r
= (min{M,N}+min{K,N} −N)+. (2d)
Let X = Ψ0
[
Ω−1 0
]H
and substitute it into (1a) and
(1b). Then, (1a) and (1b) can be respectively rewritten as,
AΨ1 = XD
H
1 , (3a)
BΨ2 = XD
H
2 . (3b)
Let Ψ11, Ψ12 and Ψ13 be the collection of columns 1 : r,
r+1 : r+ s, r+ s+1 : M of Ψ1, respectively, and let Ψ21,
Ψ22 and Ψ23 be the collection of columns 1 : K − s − p,
K − s− p + 1 : K − p, K − p+ 1 : K of Ψ2, respectively.
In addition, let X1, X2 and X3 be the collection of columns
1 : r, r + 1 : r + s, r + s + 1 : k of X, respectively. We
can rewrite (3a) and (3b) as AΨ11 = X1, AΨ12 = X2Λ1,
AΨ13 = 0; BΨ21 = 0, BΨ22 = X2Λ2, BΨ23 = X3.
In the rest of the paper we will denote the GSVD decom-
position in (3a) and (3b) as
GSVD(A,B;N,M,K) = (Ψ1,Ψ2,Λ1,Λ2,X, k, r, s, p).
With the GSVD decomposition, one can decompose the
union of span(A) and span(B) into three subspaces, i.e., (i)
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Fig. 1: A MIMO two-user wiretap interference channel
span(A) ∩ span(B)⊥, which is also the same as span(X1)
and has r independent vectors, (ii) span(A)∩span(B), which
is also the same as span(X2) and has s independent vectors,
and (iii) span(A)⊥ ∩ span(B), which is also the same as
span(X3) and has p independent vectors.
Proposition 1: Consider two full rank matrices A ∈
CN×M and B ∈ CN×K , and the GSVD(A,B;N,M,K) =
(Ψ1,Ψ2,Λ1,Λ2,X, k, r, s, p).
(i) Av = Bw 6= 0 holds true if and only if
v = Φ1ys1 =
[
Ψ12Λ
−1
1 Γ(A)
] [ ys
y1
]
, (4a)
w = Φ2ys2 =
[
Ψ22Λ
−1
2 Γ(B)
] [ ys
y2
]
, (4b)
with ys being any nonzero vectors, ys1, ys2, y1 and y2 being
any vectors, with appropriate length.
(ii) The number of linearly independent vectors v satisfying
Av = Bw 6= 0 is s+ dim{null(A)}.
Proof: See Appendix A.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a MIMO interference network which consists
of a wiretap channel S1-D1-E and a point-to-point channel S2-
D2 (see Fig. 1). In a real setting, the former channel would
correspond to a source-destination pair that needs to maintain
secret communications, while the latter would correspond to
a public communication system. While communicating with
its intended destination, S2 acts as a jammer to the external
passive eavesdropper E. S1 and S2 are equipped with N1s , N2s
antennas, respectively; D1, D2 and E are equipped with N1d ,
N2d and Ne antennas, respectively. Let s1 ∼ CN (0, I) and
s2 ∼ CN (0, I) be the messages transmitted from S1 and S2,
respectively. Each message is precoded by a matrix before
transmission. The signals received at the legitimate receiver
Di can be expressed as
yid = Hi1Vs1 +Hi2Ws2 + n
i
d, i = 1, 2, (5)
while the signal received at the eavesdropper E can be ex-
pressed as
ye = G1Vs1 +G2Ws2 + ne. (6)
Here, V ∈ CN1s×Kv and W ∈ CN2s×Kw are the precoding
matrices at S1 and S2, respectively; nid ∼ CN (0, I) and ne ∼
CN (0, I) represent noise at the ith destination Di and the
eavesdropper E, respectively; Hij ∈ CNid×Njs , i, j ∈ {1, 2},
denotes the channel matrix from Sj to Di; Gj ∈ CNe×Njs ,
j ∈ {1, 2}, represents the channel matrix from Sj to E.
In this paper, we make the following assumptions:
1) The messages s1 and s2 are independent of each other,
and independent of the noise vectors nid and ne.
2) CCI is treated as noise at each receiver. We assume
Gaussian signaling for S2. Thus the MIMO wiretap
channel S1-D1-E is Gaussian. For this case, a Gaussian
input signal at S1 is the optimal choice [33], [34].
3) All channel matrices are full rank. Global channel state
information (CSI) is available, including the CSI for the
eavesdropper. This is possible in situations in which the
eavesdropper is an active member of the network, and
thus its whereabouts and behavior can be monitored.
The achievable secrecy rate for transmitting the message s1
and s2 are respectively given as [35]
R1s = (R
1
d −Re)+, (7)
R2s = R
2
d. (8)
where
R1d = log|I+ (I+H12QwHH12)−1H11QvHH11|, (9a)
R2d = log|I+ (I+H21QvHH21)−1H22QwHH22|, (9b)
Re = log|I+ (I+G2QwGH2 )−1G1QvGH1 |, (9c)
with Qv , VVH and Qw , WWH denoting the transmit
covariance matrices of S1 and S2, respectively.
The achievable secrecy rate region is the set of all se-
crecy rate pairs, i.e., R ∆= ∪
(V,W)∈I
(R1s, R
2
s), where I ,
{(V,W)|tr{VVH} = P, tr{WWH} = P}, with P denot-
ing the transmit power budget. Generally, the determination
of the outer boundary of R is a non-convex problem. Next,
we study a simpler problem, namely the achievable secrecy
degrees of freedom region, defined as
D ∆= ∪
(V,W)∈I
(d1s, d
2
s), (10)
where dis denotes the high SNR behavior of the achievable
secrecy rate, i.e.,
dis , lim
P→∞
Ris
log P
, i ∈ {1, 2}. (11)
As shown in Fig. 2, the outer boundary of D consists of the
strict S.D.o.F. region boundary (the part between E1 and E2
in the graph) and the non-strict S.D.o.F. region boundary (the
vertical part below E1 and the horizontal part up to E2 of the
graph). The points marked by SU1 and SU2 correspond to
single user S.D.o.F., i.e., when only one user communicates.
For an arbitrary point on the strict S.D.o.F. region boundary, it
is impossible to improve one S.D.o.F., without decreasing the
other. On the other hand, for a point on the non-strict S.D.o.F.
region boundary, one S.D.o.F. can be further improved while
the other S.D.o.F. remains at the maximum value.
In the following, we will determine the outer boundary of
D, and find its connection to the number of antennas. Towards
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that goal, we first introduce a cooperative transmission scheme.
Then, by studying that scheme we determine in closed form
the outer boundary of D and also we construct the precoding
matrices which achieve the outer boundary of D.
IV. COOPERATIVE SECRECY TRANSMISSION SCHEME
Proposition 2: For the precoding matrix pair (V,W), the
achieved S.D.o.F. equals
d1s(V,W) = rank{H11V} −m(V,W) − n(V,W), (12a)
d2s(V,W) = dim{span(H22W)/span(H21V)}, (12b)
in which m(V,W) , dim{span(G1V)/span(G2W)} and
n(V,W) , dim{span(H12W) ∩ span(H11V)}.
Proof: See Appendix B.
According to Proposition 2, the achievable S.D.o.F. of
S1-D1 depends only on the dimension difference of the
interference-free subspaces which D1 and E can see. Motivated
by this observation, we propose a transmission scheme in
which the subspace spanned by the message signal has no
intersection with the subspace spanned by the interference
signal at D1, and belongs to the subspace spanned by the inter-
ference signal at E. In this way, D1 can see an interference-free
message signal, such that R1d scales with log(P ), while E can
only see a distorted version of the message signal, such that
Re converges to a constant as P approaches to infinity. In
other words, the precoding matrix pairs belongs to the set I¯,
which is defined as follows:
I¯ , {(V,W)|(V,W) ∈ I¯1 ∩ I¯2 ∩ I},
where
I¯1 , {(V,W)|span(G1V) ⊂ span(G2W)}, (13a)
I¯2 , {(V,W)|span(H11V) ∩ span(H12W) = 0}. (13b)
Next, we show that the proposed scheme can achieve all the
boundary points of the S.D.o.F. region.
Proposition 3: Let
D¯ ∆= ∪
(V,W)∈I¯
(d1s, d
2
s). (14)
Then, the outer boundary of D¯ is the same as that of D.
Proof: See Appendix C.
By restricting (V,W) to lie in I¯ , we exclude a large
number of precoding matrix pairs in I, which have no contri-
bution to the outer boundary, and thus reduce the number of
precoding matrices we need to investigate in determining the
outer boundary of the S.D.o.F. region. It turns out that we can
reduce the set even further without changing the achievable
S.D.o.F. region; this is discussed in the following corollary,
where we introduce a new set Iˆ, which is a subset of I¯.
Corollary 1: Let
Dˆ ∆= ∪
(V,W)∈Iˆ
(d1s, d
2
s), (15)
where the set of Iˆ is defined as follows,
Iˆ , {(V,W)|G1V = G2W(:, 1 : Kv), (V,W) ∈ I¯}.
(16)
Then, Dˆ = D¯.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Corollary 2: For any given precoding matrix pair
(V,W) ∈ I¯ , the achieved S.D.o.F. over the wiretap channel
S1-D1-E is d1s = rank(H11V).
Proof: Since (V,W) ∈ I¯, it holds that span(G1V) ⊂
span(G2W), which indicates lim
P→∞
Re
log(P )
= 0. In addition,
span(H11V) ∩ span(H12W) = 0, thus lim
P→∞
R1d
log(P )
=
rank(H11V). So,
d1s = lim
P→∞
R1d
log(P )
− lim
P→∞
Re
log(P )
= rank(H11V).
This completes the proof.
V. COMPUTATION OF THE S.D.O.F. BOUNDARY
The key idea for computing the S.D.o.F. boundary is to
maximize the value of d2s for a fixed value of d1s, say d1s = dˆ1s.
Based on Corollary 1, in order to determine the outer boundary
of D, we only need to focus on the set Iˆ (see eq. (16)).
Further, Corollary 2 shows that for (V,W) ∈ Iˆ the achieved
S.D.o.F. is d1s = rank{H11V}. The problem of interest now
is to construct precoding matrices which satisfy (V,W) ∈ Iˆ,
Kv = dˆ
1
s , and also leave a maximum dimension interference-
free subspace for D2.
For ease of exposition, let (v,w)1 denote the precoding
vector pair. Some observations are in order. First, one can
see that when the source message sent by S1 lies in the
null space of the eavesdropping channel, even if the pair
S2-D2 communicates, their interference cannot degrade any
further the eavesdropping channel because the eavesdropper
already receives nothing; in those cases we may take w = 0.
Second, according to Corollary 2, for any precoding matrix
pairs (V,W) ∈ Iˆ, the achieved S.D.o.F. d1s = rank{H11V}.
Thus, a greater value of d1s can be achieved by including
more linear independent precoding vector pairs in (V,W).
1The precoding vector pairs (v,w) we consider in the construction of
(V,W) are linear independent of each other.
5Third, the maximum number of linear precoding vector pairs
is determined by (13b), which requires that
dim{span(H11V)} + dim{span(H12W)} ≤ N1d . (17)
Fourth, the maximum dimension of the interference-free sub-
space at D2 depends on whether D2 experiences interference
from S1. So, in the following subsections, we will divide the
set satisfying G1v = G2w into six subsets, according to
whether the source message from S1 lies in the null space
of the eavesdropping channel, whether the source message
from S2 has interference on D1, and whether the source
message from S1 has interference on D2. Accordingly, we
characterize the precoding vector pairs in each subset with
the signal dimension triplet (a, b, c), where a and b denote
the number of signal dimensions we respectively need at D1
and S2, and c denotes the signal dimension penalty at D2, for
obtaining one S.D.o.F. over the wiretap channel S1-D1-E. In
particular, a , rank{H11v} + rank{H12w}; b , rank{w};
c , rank{H21v}. Then,
1) if the message signal sent by S1 spreads within the null
space of the eavesdropping channel, the message signal
sent from S1 is secure even without the help of S2, thus
b = 0, a = 1; otherwise, b = 1.
2) if the message signal sent by S2 interferes with D1, we
need at least two signal dimensions at D1 in order to
tell the message signal sent by S1 apart from that sent
by S2, which means that a = 2; otherwise, a = 1.
3) if the message signal sent by S1 interferes with D2,
the signal dimension penalty at D2 is one, thus c = 1;
otherwise, c = 0.
Please refer to Table I for the triplet (a, b, c) of the precoding
vector pair from each subset. Based on this triplet (a, b, c),
in this section, we will analyze the Single-User points SU1
and SU2, the strict S.D.o.F. region boundary, and the ending
points of strict S.D.o.F. region boundary E1 and E2.
A. Aligned signal subspace decomposition
In this subsection, we divide the set satisfying G1v = G2w
into six subsets, i.e., SubI,..., SubVI, and determine the num-
ber of linear independent precoding vector pairs that should
be considered in each subset, i.e., dI,...,dVI, respectively.
I) The message signal sent by S1 spreads within the null
space of the eavesdropping channel, and does not interfere
with D2. That is, the precoding vector pairs in SubI should
satisfy
G1v = 0, (18a)
H21v = 0. (18b)
Further, it holds that G2w = G1v = 0. The case where
G1v = G2w = 0 and w 6= 0 is not considered here, because
even if the pair S2-D2 communicates, their interference cannot
degrade any further the eavesdropping channel. So we will
consider w = 0 for simplicity. Substituting v = Γ(G1)x
into (18b), with x being any vectors with appropriate length,
we arrive at H21Γ(G1)x = 0, which is equivalent to x =
Γ(H21Γ(G1))y, with y being any vectors with appropriate
length. Therefore, the formula of v in SubI is
v = Γ(G1)Γ(H21Γ(G1))z, (19)
with z being any nonzero vectors with appropriate length. In
addition, since all the channel matrices are assumed to be full
rank, it holds that
dI ≤ dim{null(H21Γ(G1))} = (N1s −Ne −N2d )+. (20)
II) The message signal sent by S1 spreads within the null
space of the eavesdropping channel, but does interfere with
D2. That is, the vectors in SubII should satisfy
G1v = 0, (21a)
H21v 6= 0. (21b)
Here again, we will consider w = 0 for simplicity. On
combining (18a)-(18b) with (21a)-(21b), it holds that
SubI ∪ SubII = {(v,w)|G1v = 0,w = 0}. (22)
So, the linear independent vectors we can choose from SubI
and SubII should be no greater than dim{null(G1)}. That is,
dII + dI ≤ (N1s −Ne)+. (23)
III) The message signal sent by S1 does not spread within
the null space of the eavesdropping channel. The message
signals sent by S1 and S2 do not interfere with D2 and
D1, respectively. That is, the precoding vector pairs in SubIII
should satisfy
H12w = 0, (24a)
H21v = 0, (24b)
G1v =G2w 6= 0. (24c)
Substituting v = Γ(H21)x and w = Γ(H12)y into (24c), we
arrive at
G1Γ(H21)x = G2Γ(H12)y 6= 0. (25)
Consider the decomposition
GSVD(G1Γ(H21),G2Γ(H12);Ne, Nˆ
1
s , Nˆ
2
s )
= (Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, Λˆ1, Λˆ2, Xˆ, kˆ, rˆ, sˆ, pˆ),
where Nˆ1s , (N1s − N2d )+ and Nˆ2s , (N2s − N1d )+.
Applying Proposition 1, we can obtain the number of linearly
independent vectors v satisfying (25), i.e.,
dˆIII , sˆ+ dim{null(G1Γ(H21))}.
Since null(G1Γ(H21)) = null(H21Γ(G1)), the basis of
null(G1Γ(H21)) also spans the solution space of v in SubI.
Thus,
dIII + dI ≤ dˆIII = sˆ+ (N1s −Ne −N2d )+, (26)
IV) The message signal sent by S1 does not spread within
the null space of the eavesdropping channel. The message
signal sent by S2 does not interfere with D1, but the message
6TABLE I: The triplet (a, b, c) corresponding to the precoding vector pair from each subset and the number of linear independent
precoding vector pairs that should be considered in each subset
subsets (a,b,c) maximum number of linear independent precoding vector pairs (v,w)
SubI (1, 0, 0) dI = (N
1
s −Ne −N
2
d
)+
SubII (1, 0, 1) dII = min{N
2
d
, (N1s −Ne)
+}
SubIII (1, 1, 0) dIII = (min{(N
1
s −N
2
d
)+, Ne}+min{(N2s −N
1
d
)+, Ne} −Ne)+
SubIV (1, 1, 1) dIV = (min{N
1
s , Ne}+min{(N
2
s −N
1
d
)+, Ne} −Ne)+ − dIII
SubV (2, 1, 0) dV = (min{(N
1
s −N
2
d
)+, Ne}+min{N2s , Ne} −Ne)
+ − dIII
SubVI (2, 1, 1) dVI = (min{N
1
s , Ne}+min{N
2
s , Ne} −Ne)
+ − (dIII + dIV + dV)
signal sent by S1 interferes with D2. That is, the precoding
vector pairs in SubIV should satisfy
H12w = 0, (27a)
H21v 6= 0, (27b)
G1v =G2w 6= 0. (27c)
Substituting w = Γ(H12)y into (27c), we get
G1v =G2Γ(H12)y 6= 0. (28)
Consider the decomposition
GSVD(G1,G2Γ(H12);Ne, N
1
s , Nˆ
2
s )
= (Ψ¯1, Ψ¯2, Λ¯1, Λ¯2, X¯, k¯, r¯, s¯, p¯).
Applying Proposition 1 we can obtain the number of linearly
independent vectors v satisfying (28), i.e.,
dˆIV , s¯+ dim{null(G1)}.
On combining (24a)-(24c) with (27a)-(27c), it holds that
SubIII ∪ SubIV = {(v,w)|H12w = 0,G1v = G2w 6= 0}
In addition, the basis of null(G1) also spans the solution space
of v in SubI ∪ SubII. Therefore,
dIV + dIII + dII + dI ≤ dˆIV = s¯+ (N1s −Ne)+. (29)
V) The message signal sent by S1 does not spread within the
null space of the eavesdropping channel. The message signal
sent by S2 interferes with D1, but the message signal sent by
S1 does not interfere with D2. That is, the precoding vector
pairs in SubV should satisfy
H12w 6= 0, (30a)
H21v = 0, (30b)
G1v =G2w 6= 0. (30c)
Substituting v = Γ(H21)x into (30c), we obtain
G1Γ(H21)x =G2w 6= 0. (31)
Consider the decomposition
GSVD(G1Γ(H21),G2;Ne, Nˆ
1
s , N
2
s )
= (Ψ˘1, Ψ˘2, Λ˘1, Λ˘2, X˘, k˘, r˘, s˘, p˘).
Applying Proposition 1, we can obtain the number of linearly
independent vectors v satisfying (31), i.e.,
dˆV , s˘+ dim{null(G1Γ(H21))}.
On combining (24a)-(24c) with (30a)-(30c), it holds that
SubIII ∪ SubV = {(v,w)|H21v = 0,G1v =G2w 6= 0}
In addition, the basis of null(G1Γ(H21)) also spans the
solution space of v in SubI. Therefore,
dV + dIII + dI ≤ dˆV = s˘+ (N1s −Ne −N2d )+. (32)
VI) The message signal sent by S1 does not spread within
the null space of the eavesdropping channel. The message sig-
nals sent by S2 and S1 interfere with D1 and D2, respectively.
That is, the precoding vector pairs in SubVI should satisfy
H12w 6= 0, (33a)
H21v 6= 0, (33b)
G1v =G2w 6= 0. (33c)
Consider the decomposition
GSVD(G1,G2;Ne, N
1
s , N
2
s ) = (Ψ˜1, Ψ˜2, Λ˜1, Λ˜2, X˜, k˜, r˜, s˜, p˜).
According to Proposition 1, we can obtain the number of
linearly independent vectors v satisfying (33c), i.e.,
ds , s˜+ dim{null(G1)}.
On combining (33a)-(33c) with (24a)-(24c), (27a)-(27c) and
(30a)-(30c), it holds that SubIII ∪ SubIV ∪ SubV ∪ SubVI =
{(v,w)|G1v = G2w 6= 0}. In addition, the basis of
null(G1) also spans the solution space of v in SubI ∪ SubII.
Thus,
dVI + dV + dIV + dIII + dII + dI ≤ ds. (34)
We should note that with all three variables smaller than
the corresponding variables of other triplets, the precoding
vector pair from SubI has the potential to achieve a greater
S.D.o.F. than the others, and so it has the highest priority
in the construction of (V,W). Similarly, the precoding vec-
tor pair from SubIV has lower priority than that one from
SubI ∪ SubII ∪ SubIII; the precoding vector pair from SubV
has lower priority than that one from SubI ∪ SubIII; and the
precoding vector pair from SubVI has the lowest priority.
Therefore, all the equalities in (20), (23), (26), (29), (32)
and (34) hold true. As a conclusion, the number of linear
independent precoding vector pairs that should be considered
in each subset is given in Table I.
Correspondingly, in what follows, we give the formulas of
v and w we consider in each subset. Combining the formula
7of v in SubI, i.e., (19), and that one in SubI∪SubII, i.e., (22),
we obtain the one in SubII, i.e.,
v = Γ(G1)Γ
⊥(H21Γ(G1))z + Γ(G1)Γ(H21Γ(G1))y.
with z being any nonzero vectors with appropriate length.
Since we want linear independent precoding vectors, the
beamforming direction already considered in the set with
higher priority, e.g., SubI, should not be under consideration
in other subsets. Thus, the formula of v in SubII is
v = Γ(G1)Γ
⊥(H21Γ(G1))z. (35)
Similarly, the formulas of v and w in SubIII are, respectively,
v = Ψˆ12Λˆ
−1
1 z,w = Ψˆ22Λˆ
−1
2 z. (36)
The formulas of v and w in SubIV are, respectively,
v = Ψ¯12Λ¯
−1
1 z,w = Ψ¯22Λ¯
−1
2 z. (37)
The formulas of v and w in SubV are, respectively,
v = Ψ˘12Λ˘
−1
1 z,w = Ψ˘22Λ˘
−1
2 z. (38)
And the formulas of v and w in SubVI are, respectively,
v = Ψ˜12Λ˜
−1
1 z,w = Ψ˜22Λ˜
−1
2 z. (39)
We should note that since H21 is independent of the channels
G1, G2 andH12, for precoding vector pairs in (37) H21v 6= 0
holds true with probability one. Similar argument also applies
in the derivation of the formulas of v and w in SubV and
SubVI.
B. Single-User points SU1(d¯1s, 0) and SU2(0, d¯2s)
A single-user point corresponds to a scenario in which only
one source-destination communicates. Let d¯1s and d¯2s denote
the maximum achievable value of d1s and d2s, respectively.
1) The single-user point SU1(d¯1s, 0): In this case, the pair
S2-D2 does not communicate, but S2 still transmits, acting as a
cooperative jammer targeting at degrading the eavesdropping
channel. In this case, the system model reduces to a wiretap
channel with a cooperative jammer. Based on Corollary 1
and Corollary 2, we see that our problem for maximizing
d1s is including as more precoding vector pairs as possible
in (V,W). In Table I, we divide the set which satisfies
G1v = G2w into six subsets. Due to the requirement in (17),
it holds that more precoding vector pairs can be included in
(V,W) by choosing precoding vector pairs from the subsets
with smaller a. For example, a = 1 for SubIV while a = 2
for SubVI. We can select at most N1d precoding vector pairs
from SubIV, in which a = 1, while we can select only
⌊N1d/2⌋ precoding vector pairs from SubVI, in which a = 2.
In addition, since the achieved S.D.o.F. is d1s = rank{H11V},
a greater value of d1s can be achieved with precoding vector
pairs from SubIV. Therefore, in the construction of (V,W),
the precoding vector pairs from the first four subsets have the
same priority, and the precoding vector pairs from the last two
subsets have the same priority. Moreover, a precoding vector
pair from the first four subsets has higher priority than that
one from the last two subsets. If N1d ≤ dI + dII + dIII + dIV,
we just select N1d precoding vector pairs from SubI∪SubII∪
SubIII ∪ SubIV; otherwise, we first select all the precoding
vector pairs in SubI ∪ SubII ∪ SubIII ∪ SubIV, and then we
pick ⌊N
1
d − (dI + dII + dIII + dIV)
2
⌋ precoding vector pairs
from SubV ∪ SubVI.
Example 1: Consider the case (N1s , N1d , Ne) = (6, 3, 6),
(N2s , N
2
d ) = (6, 6). Based on Table I, the maximum number
of linear independent precoding vector pairs in each subset is
dI = 0, dII = 0, dIII = 0, dIV = 3, dV = 0, dVI = 3. Since
N1d = dI+dII+dIII+dIV, we first select three precoding vector
pairs in SubIV. We cannot pick any more precoding vector
pairs without violating (17) since in that case the the remaining
signal dimension at D1 is N1d − dIV = 0. Concluding, we
can select a total of 3 precoding vector pairs, and based on
Corollary 2, d¯1s = 3.
Example 2: Consider the case (N1s , N1d , Ne) = (6, 5, 5),
(N2s , N
2
d ) = (6, 4). Based on Table I we get that dI = 0,
dII = 1, dIII = 0, dIV = 1, dV = 2, dVI = 2. Since N1d >
dI+dII+dIII+dIV, we first select all the precoding vector pairs
in SubII and SubIV, i.e., (v1,w1), (v2,w2), with H12w1 = 0
and H12w2 = 0. From the remaining sets SubV and SubVI,
we can at most pick one pair, i.e., (v3,w3). For either SubV or
SubVI, it holds that H12w3 6= 0. Thus, for V = [v1 v2 v3]
and W = [w1 w2 w3] it holds that dim{span(H11V)} +
dim{span(H12W)} = 3 + 1 = 4. If we picked another pair,
(17) would be violated. Concluding, we can select a total of
3 precoding vector pairs, and based on Corollary 2, d¯1s = 3.
Summarizing, the maximum achievable value d¯1s, i.e.,
d¯1s = min{da=1 + d⋆a=2, N1d}, (40)
where da=1 = dI + dII + dIII + dIV, and
d⋆a=2 = min{dV + dVI, ⌊(N1d − da=1)+/2⌋}.
Remark 1: To gain more insight into d¯1s , we give Table II
which shows the dependence of d¯1s on the number of antennas.
2) The single-user point of SU2(0, d¯2s): In this case, the
wiretap channel S1-D1-E does not work. For a point-to-point
MIMO user, the maximum achievable degrees of freedom
equals min{N2s , N2d}. That is,
d¯2s = min{N2s , N2d}. (41)
C. Computation of the strict S.D.o.F. region boundary
The key idea for computing the strict S.D.o.F. boundary is
to maximize the value of d2s for a fixed value of d1s.
Assume that V consists of dˆ1s columns, among which z
columns come from a subset for which the message signal
sent by S1 interferes with D2. Then, D2 can at most see a
(N2d − z)+-dimension interference-free subspace. Thus,
dˆ2s(z) ≤ (N2d − z)+. (42)
In addition, it holds that dˆ1s +dim{span(H12W)} ≤ N1d due
to (17). So,
rank{W} ≤ (max{N2s , N1d} − dˆ1s)+. (43)
8TABLE II: Summary of the closed-form results on d¯1s
Inequalities on the number of antennas at terminals d¯1s
N1s ≥ Ne +N
1
d
N2s ≥ Ne +N
1
d
min{N1s , N
1
d
}
2N1
d
+Ne −N2s ≤ N
1
s < Ne +N
1
d
N1
d
< N2s < Ne +N
1
d
N1
d
+Ne −N2s < N
1
s < 2N
1
d
+Ne −N2s N
1
s +N
2
s − (N
1
d
+Ne) + min{s, ⌊
2N
1
d+Ne−N
1
s−N
2
s
2
⌋}
N1
d
< N2s < Ne +N
1
d
s = min{N1
d
+Ne −N2s , Ne}+min{N
2
s , Ne} −Ne
Ne < N
1
s < Ne +N
1
d
, N2s ≤ N
1
d
N1s −Ne +min{s, ⌊
N
1
d+Ne−N
1
s
2
⌋}, s = min{N2s , Ne}
N1s ≤ N
1
d
+Ne −N2s , N
1
d
< N2s < Ne +N
1
d
min{s, ⌊
N
1
d
2
⌋}
N1s ≤ Ne, N
2
s ≤ N
1
d
s = min{N1s , Ne}+min{N
2
s , Ne} −min{N
1
s +N
2
s , Ne}
Combining (41), (42) and (43), we get the maximum achiev-
able value of d2s , i.e.,
dˆ2s(z) = min{N2s , (max{N2s , N1d} − dˆ1s)+, (N2d − z)+}.
(44)
Thus, in order to maximize the value of d2s, we only need to
minimize the value of z.
According to Table I, the minimum value of z without the
constraint d1s = dˆ1s equals (dˆ1s − (dV + dI + dIII))+. Due to
the constraint d1s = dˆ1s and the fact that a = 2 in SubV, we
have limitations on the number of pairs that can be selected
from SubV. For example, consider the case dI + dIII = 2,
dV = 2, N
1
d = 3 and dˆ1s = 3. The minimum value of z
without the constraint d1s = dˆ1s = 3 equals 0, in which case
we need at least choose one pair from SubV. Noting that (17)
should be satisfied for (V,W) ∈ Iˆ and a = 2 in SubV, if we
have picked one pair from SubV, we can then at most pick
one more pair from the first four subsets. Thus, the maximum
achievable value of d1s equals 2, which violates the constraint
d1s = 3. Due to the constraint d1s = 3 and the fact that a = 2
in SubV, we cannot select any pairs from SubV, and so the
minimum value of z equals to 1.
Let x and y denote the number of columns which come from
the first four subsets and the last two subsets, respectively. The
maximum allowable value of y under the constraint of d1s = dˆ1s
is
ymax ,max
x,y
y
s.t. x+ y = dˆ1s, (45a)
x+ 2y ≤ N1d , (45b)
0 ≤ x ≤ dI + dII + dIII + dIV, (45c)
0 ≤ y ≤ dV + dVI. (45d)
Substituting x = dˆ1s− y into (45b), we arrive at y ≤ N1d − dˆ1s,
which combined with (45c) and (45d) gives
ymax = min{N1d − dˆ1s, dV + dVI, dˆ1s}. (46)
Thus, we can select at most min{ymax, dV} precoding vector
pairs from SubV. Therefore, the minimum value of z is,
zmin(dˆ
1
s) = (dˆ
1
s − (min{ymax, dV}+ dI + dIII))+. (47)
Substituting (47) into (44), we obtain the maximum value of
d2s, i.e.,
dˆ2s = min{N2s , (max{N2s , N1d} − dˆ1s)+, (N2d − zmin(dˆ1s))+}.
(48)
Remark 2: For any given values of d1s, we can derive a
maximum achievable value of d2s based on (48). Finally, the
strict S.D.o.F. region boundary can be computed based on the
following iteration:
1) Initialize dˆ1s = d¯1s;
2) Compute dˆ2s with (48);
3) Compare dˆ2s with d¯2s. If dˆ2s < d¯2s , let dˆ1s = dˆ1s−1 and go
to 2); otherwise, stop and output all the pairs (dˆ1s, dˆ2s).
Example 3: Let us revisit Example 2, for which we obtained
d¯1s = 3 and d¯2s = 4, respectively. Initialize dˆ1s with d¯1s = 3.
Substituting dˆ1s = 3 into (48), we obtain dˆ2s = 3. Since dˆ2s <
d¯2s, we continue the iteration. Letting dˆ1s = 2 and substituting it
into (48), we obtain dˆ2s = 4, which equals d¯2s . So, we stop the
iteration and output all the S.D.o.F. pairs on the strict S.D.o.F.
region boundary, i.e., (dˆ1s, dˆ2s) = (3, 3) and (dˆ1s, dˆ2s) = (2, 4).
D. Ending points of strict S.D.o.F. region boundary E1(d¯1s,
d2s) and E2(d1s, d¯2s)
As shown in Fig. 2, E1 and E2 denote the ending points of
the strict S.D.o.F. region boundary. In particular, d2s denotes
the maximum achievable value of d2s under the constraint d1s =
d¯1s, and d
1
s denotes the maximum achievable value of d1s under
the constraint d2s = d¯2s.
1) The ending point E1(d¯1s, d2s). According to (40), we
obtain d¯1s which denotes the maximum achievable value of
d1s. Substituting dˆ1s = d¯1s into (46)-(48), we arrive at
d2s = min{N2s , (max{N2s , N1d} − d¯1s)+, (N2d − zmin(d¯1s))+}.
(49)
2) The ending point E2(d1s, d¯2s). According to the previous
analysis on the single-user point of SU2(0, d¯2s), we obtain
d¯2s = min{N2s , N2d}, which, combined with (44), gives
min{N2s , N2d} ≤ max{N2s , N1d} − d1s, (50a)
min{N2s , N2d} ≤ N2d − z. (50b)
In the following, we consider two distinct cases.
9(i) For the case of N2s > N2d , (50a) becomes
d1s ≤ max{N2s , N1d} −N2d . (51)
Besides, (50b) indicates that z = 0, and thus all of the signal
steams sent by S1 should not interfere with D2. That is, SubII,
SubIV and SubVI are not under consideration. Applying (40),
we obtain
d1s ≤ min{dI + dIII + β⋆, N1d}, (52)
whereβ⋆ = min{dV, ⌊(N1d − dI − dIII)+/2⌋}. Combining
(51) and (52), we arrive at
d1s = min{dI + dIII + β⋆,max{N2s , N1d} −N2d , N1d}. (53)
(ii) For the case of N2s ≤ N2d , (50a) becomes
d1s ≤ max{N2s , N1d} −N2s , (54)
which indicates that d1s = 0 when N2s ≥ N1d . So, in the follow-
ing, we only consider the case of N2s < N1d , where it holds that
dIII = dIV = 0. In addition, (50b) indicates that z ≤ N2d−N2s .
Therefore, ξ = min{dVI, (N2d −N2s − dII)+} + dV, where ξ
denotes the maximum number of precoding vector pairs that
can be chosen from SubV and SubVI. Applying (40), we get
d1s ≤ min{dI + dˆII + ξ⋆, N1d}, (55)
where dˆII = min{N2d −N2s , dII}, and
ξ⋆ = min{ξ, ⌊(N1d − dI − dˆII)+/2⌋}.
Combining (54) and (55), we arrive at
d1s = min{dI + dˆII + ξ⋆,max{N2s , N1d} −N2s }. (57)
We should note that this expression also applies to the case of
N2s ≥ N1d , where d1s = 0.
Summarizing the above two cases, we arrive at
d1s =
{
min{dI + dIII + β⋆, η −N2d , N1d}, if N2s > N2d
min{dI + dˆII + ξ⋆, η −N2s }, if N2s ≤ N2d
(58)
where η = max{N2s , N1d}.
VI. CONSTRUCTION OF PRECODING MATRICES WHICH
ACHIEVE THE POINT ON THE S.D.O.F. REGION BOUNDARY
According to Section V. C, by carefully choosing (v,w) we
are able to construct precoding matrix pairs (V,W) which
achieve the S.D.o.F. pairs on the S.D.o.F. region boundary.
In particular, by selecting u = min{dˆ1s,min{ymax, dV} +
dI + dIII} pairs from Subo = SubI ∪ SubIII ∪ SubV and
t = dˆ1s−u pairs from Sube = SubII∪SubIV∪SubVI, subject
to the number of pairs selected from SubV ∪ SubVI being
no greater than ymax, we have completed the construction of
precoding matrices (V,W(:, 1 : Kv)) ∈ Iˆ. This construction
satisfies d1s = dˆ1s and also leaves a maximum dimension,
i.e., d2s = dˆ2s (see eq. (48)), interference-free subspace for
D2. Further, if dˆ2s ≤ rank(W(:, 1 : Kv)), S2 does not need
to add any beamforming vectors, and the S.D.o.F. of dˆ2s is
achieved. In this case, Kw equals the number of nonzero
columns of W(:, 1 : Kv). If dˆ2s > rank(W(:, 1 : Kv)),
S2 can add d˘2s = dˆ2s − rank(W(:, 1 : Kv)) columns to its
TABLE III: An algorithm for constructing (V,W) which
achieve (dˆ1s, dˆ2s) on the S.D.o.F. region boundary
1. Initialize u = min{dˆ1s ,min{ymax, dV}+ dI + dIII}, t = dˆ1s − u;
2. (Vo,Wo)← select u precoding vector pairs from Subo;
3. (Ve,We)← select t precoding vector pairs from Sube;
4. V← [Vo Ve];
5. W1 ← [Wo We];
6. Let d˘2s = dˆ2s − rank(W1);
7. if d˘2s > 0
8. Let d˜2s = min{d˘2s , (N2s −N1d )
+};
9. W2 ← A(:, 1 : d˜2s), where A = Γ(H12);
10. Do the singular value decomposition (SVD) H22 = USRH ;
11. W ← [W1 W2 R(:, 1 : d˘2s − d˜2s)];
12. else
13. W ←W1;
14. end
15. Output: (V,W).
precoding matrix without violating any constraints of Iˆ and
also achieves an S.D.o.F. of dˆ2s. In particular, by adding the
first d˜2s = min{d˘2s, (N2s −N1d )+} columns of Γ(H12) and the
first d˘2s − d˜2s columns of R as the other beamforming vectors
at S2, we complete the construction of the precoding matrices
(V,W). In this case Kw = dˆ2s. Here R is obtained with the
singular value decomposition (SVD) H22 = USRH . By this
SVD the channelH22 is decomposed into several parallel sub-
channels, and the first d˘2s − d˜2s columns of R correspond the
ones which are of better channel quality than the others.
Example 4: Let us revisit Example 3, in which we obtained
an S.D.o.F. pair (dˆ1s, dˆ2s) = (2, 4) on the strict S.D.o.F. region
boundary. According to Section V. C, at this boundary point,
ymax = 2 and zmin = 0. Since u = 2, dI = dIII = 0 and
dV = 2, we first select two precoding vector pairs in SubV,
i.e., (v1,w1) and (v2,w2), with H21v1 = 0, H21v2 = 0,
H12w1 6= 0 and H12w2 6= 0. From the remaining sets we do
not pick any pairs since t = 0. So far, we have finished the
construction ofV andW(:, 1 : Kv), i.e., [v1 v2] and [w1 w2].
Since d˘2s = dˆ2s − rank(W(:, 1 : Kv)) = 2 > 0, we further add
d˜2s = min{d˘2s, (N2s −N1d )+} = 1 column of Γ(H12), i.e., w3,
with H12w3 = 0, and d˘2s− d˜2s = 1 column of R, i.e., w4, with
H22w4 6= 0, as the other beamforming vectors at S2. Since
H11vi 6= 0,H22wi 6= 0 andH12w4 6= 0 hold true with proba-
bility one, for V = [v1 v2] and W = [w1 w2 w3 w4] it holds
that dim{span(H11V)} + dim{span(H12W)} = 2 + 3 = 5
and dim{span(H22W)}+ dim{span(H21V)} = 4 + 0 = 4.
Therefore, the S.D.o.F. pair (dˆ1s, dˆ2s) = (2, 4) is achieved.
Concluding, an algorithm for constructing (V,W) is given
in TABLE III. Note that the formulas of vi and wi in Subi,
i = I, II, · · · ,VI, are given in (19), (35), (36), (37), (38) and
(39), respectively.
Remark 3: In light of (12a) and (12b) derived in Proposition
2, whenever we find a solution (V,W) achieving the S.D.o.F.
pair (dˆ1s, dˆ2s) on the S.D.o.F. region boundary, we actually find
the solution spaces span(V) and span(W), i.e., the precoding
matrices (VA,WB) also achieve the S.D.o.F. pair (dˆ1s, dˆ2s) on
the S.D.o.F. region boundary as long asA andB are invertible.
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VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we give numerical results to validate our
theoretical findings. For simplicity, we consider a simple
semi-symmetric system model, as illustrated in Fig. 3. In
particular, the antenna numbers N1s = N1d = Ne , N1,
and N2s = N2d , N2. We assume that Di or E is uniformly
distributed on a ring of radius 1 ≤ R ≤ 10 (unit: meters) and
center located at Si. The source-destination distances or the
source-eavesdropper distance are no greater than the source-
source distance. To highlight the effects of distances, the
channel between any transmit-receiver antenna pair is modeled
by a simple line-of-sight channel model including the path
loss effect and a random phase, i.e., h12 = d−c/212 ejθ where
d12 denotes the distance between the S2 and D1, c = 3.5
is the path loss exponent, θ is the random phase uniformly
distributed within [0, 2pi). The distances between transmit or
receiver antennas at each terminal are assumed to be much
smaller than the source-destination distance or the source-
eavesdropper distance, so the path losses of different transmit-
receiver antenna pairs from the same transmit-receiver link
are approximately the same. S2 is located at a fixed two-
dimensional coordinates (0,0) (unit: meters), while S1 moves
from (350,0) to (10,0). The transmitting power of each source
is P = 0dBm. Results are averaged over one hundred thousand
independent channel trials.
Fig. 4 illustrates the achievable secrecy transmission rate
of the user S1-D1, and also the achievable transmission rate
of the user S2-D2 for N1 = 4 and N2 = 2. The noise
power σ2 = −60dBm and σ2 = −40dBm are considered,
respectively. According to (48), we see that with our proposed
cooperative transmission scheme, the S.D.o.F. pair (1,1) can be
achieved. We compute the precoding vectors v and w accord-
ing to TABLE III, and compute the achievable transmission
rate of each user according to (7) and (8), respectively. It
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Fig. 5: Achievable secrecy degrees of freedom region with an
increasing number of antennas at S2-D2
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Fig. 6: Achievable secrecy rate of S1-D1 versus the uncertainty
of the eavesdropper’s channels α.
shows that the achievable secrecy transmission rate of S1-D1
increases monotonically as S1 moves close to S2. In contrast,
the achievable transmission rate of S2-D2 decreases with the
decreasing of the source-source distance. As compared with
the decrease in the transmission rate of S2-D2, the increase in
the secrecy transmission rate of S1-D1 is drastic. Therefore, the
network performance benefits when the two users get closer.
Fig. 5 illustrates the achievable secrecy degrees of freedom
region versus different values of N2. Here, we set N1 = 4
and let N2 vary from 1 to 8. We compute the achievable
secrecy degrees of freedom region according to (48). As
expected, the secrecy degrees of freedom region expands with
an increasing N2. Note that previous work [36] shows that for
the classic wiretap channel with no cooperative helpers the
condition to achieve a nonzero S.D.o.F. is N1s ≥ Ne+1. Here
although N1s = Ne, by exploiting the co-channel interference
an S.D.o.F. of N1s can be achieved.
In practice, while one may have a good estimate of the
position of the eavesdropper, an estimate of the phase of
the eavesdropper’s channels is more difficult to obtain. Since
the proposed precoding matrix design highly depends on the
eavesdropper’s channels, we next examine the secrecy rate
performance degradation in the presence of imperfect channel
estimate. In Fig. 6, we plot the achievable secrecy rate with
imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper’s channels. Here, we set
N1 = 4 and let N2 vary from 2 to 6. S1 and S2 are located at
(10,0) and (0,0), respectively. The noise power σ2 = −60dBm.
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The channel from Si (i = 1, 2) to E is
Gi = d
−c/2
ei
(
1√
1 + α
G¯i +
√
α
1 + α
∆G¯i
)
, (59)
where α denotes the channel uncertainty. G¯i represents the
estimated channel part at Si. The entries of G¯i are ejθ with
θ be a random phase uniformly distributed within [0, 2pi).
∆G¯i ∼ CN (0, I) represents the Gaussian error channel ma-
trices. dei denotes the distance from Si. According to (48), we
see that the S.D.o.F. pairs (1,1), (2,1) and (3,3) can be achieved
for the case of N2 = 2, N2 = 3 and N2 = 6, respectively.
For these S.D.o.F. pairs, we construct the precoding matrices
V and W according to TABLE III, subject to power being
equally allocated between different signal streams. The achiev-
able secrecy transmission rate is computed according to (7). It
can be observed that the achievable secrecy rate drops with the
increase of channel uncertainties when the channel uncertainty
α is small. Fortunately, when the number of antennas N2
increases, this secrecy rate performance degradation is smaller.
On the other hand, on comparing the secrecy transmission rate
of S1-D1 for the case N2 = 2 with that in Fig. 4, one can see
that the secrecy rate achieved for the case where α = 0.1 and
S1-S2 distance of 10 meters, is almost equal to the secrecy rate
achieved for the case where α = 0 and S1-S2 distance of 150
meters. This suggests that in wiretap interference networks,
the secrecy rate degradation due to CSI estimation error can
be counteracted by bringing the two users closer together.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have examined the maximum achievable secrecy degrees
of freedoms (S.D.o.F.) region of a MIMO two-user wiretap
interference channel, where one user requires confidential
connection against an external passive eavesdropper, while the
other uses a public connection. We have addressed analytically
the S.D.o.F. pair maximization (component-wise). Specifically,
we have proposed a cooperative secrecy transmission scheme
and proven that its feasible set is sufficient to achieve all
the points on the S.D.o.F. region boundary. For the proposed
cooperative secrecy transmission scheme, we have obtained
analytically the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. region boundary
points. We have also constructed the precoding matrices which
achieve the S.D.o.F. region boundary. Our results revealed the
connection between the maximum achievable S.D.o.F. region
and the number of antennas, thus shedding light on how the
secrecy rate region behaves for different number of antennas.
Numerical results show that the network performance benefits
when the two users get closer. This is interesting. It tells us that
in wiretap interference networks, the secrecy rate degradation
due to CSI estimation error can be counteracted by bringing
the two users closer together.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF Proposition 1
In what follows, we prove that Av = Bw holds true if
and only if v and w are given in (4a) and (4b), with ys, ys1,
ys2, y1 and y2 being any vectors with appropriate length.
With this result, the first conclusion in Proposition 1 is a
natural extension. According to the GSVD decomposition,
AΨ12Λ
−1
1 = BΨ22Λ
−1
2 = X2. Thus, Av = Bw holds
true if v and w are given by (4a) and (4b), respectively. Next,
we prove by contradiction that Av = Bw holds true only
if v ∈ span(Φ1); the argument for w is similar. Assume
that there exists a nonzero vector v¯ /∈ span(Φ1) satisfying
Av¯ = Bw. Then, Av¯ /∈ span(AΦ1); otherwise, it holds that
Av¯ = AΦ1x which implies v¯ − Φ1x = Γ(A)y1, and so
v¯ ∈ span(Φ1) which contradicts with the assumption. How-
ever, Av¯ ∈ span(X2) due to Av¯ = Bw. In addition, by the
GSVD, span(X2) = span(AΦ1). Thus, Av¯ ∈ span(AΦ1)
and so Av¯ /∈ span(AΦ1) is contradicted. This completes the
proof of the first conclusion in Proposition 1.
According to the GSVD, AΨ13 = 0. Thus, span(Ψ13) ⊂
span(Γ(A)). In addition, rank(Ψ13) = M − r − s =
M − min{M,N} = (M − N)+, which indicates that the
linear independent vectors in span(Ψ13) is the same as that
in span(Γ(A)). So, span(Ψ13) = span(Γ(A)). Since Ψ1 is
an unitary matrix, it holds that span(Ψ12) ∩ span(Ψ13) = 0.
Therefore, span(Ψ12) ∩ span(Γ(A)) = 0, which, combined
with (4a), indicates that the number of linearly independent
vectors v satisfying Av = Bw 6= 0 is s + dim{null(A)}.
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF Proposition 2
Given an arbitrary point (V,W), with tr{Qv} = P and
tr{Qw} = P . We can respectively rewrite Qv and Qw as
Qv = P Q¯v and Qw = P Q¯w, with tr{Q¯v} = tr{Q¯w} = 1.
Correspondingly, (9a) can be rewritten as
R1d = log|I+ (I+ PH12Q¯wHH12)−1H11Q¯vHH11P |. (60)
Let Θ2 = H11Q¯vHH11. Denoting H12Q¯wHH12 =
[U1 U0]
[
Σ1 0
0 0
] [
UH1
UH0
]
as the singular value decom-
position (SVD), and substituting it into (60), we obtain
R1d =log|I+U1(I+ PΣ1)−1UH1 Θ2P +U0UH0 Θ2P |
=log|I+U1( I
P
+Σ1)
−1UH1 Θ2 +U0U
H
0 Θ2P |.
Therefore,
lim
P→∞
R1d/log(P )
= lim
P→∞
log|I+U1(Σ1)−1UH1 Θ2 +U0UH0 Θ2P |
log(P )
= lim
P→∞
log|I+ ( 1PU1(Σ1)−1UH1 +U0UH0 )Θ2P |
log(P )
= lim
P→∞
log|I+U0UH0 H11VVHHH11|
log(P )
=rank{U0UH0 H11VVHHH11} (61)
=dim{span(H11V)/span(H12W)} (62)
=rank{H11V} − dim{span(H11V) ∩ span(H12W)}.
(63)
where (61) comes from the fact that
lim
P→∞
log|I+AP |
log(P )
= lim
P→∞
∑t
i=1 log(1 + λiP )
log(P )
= rank{A},
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with λi and t being the nonzero eigenvalue and the rank of A.
(62) comes from the fact that U0UH0 is the projection matrix
of the subspace span(H12W)⊥.
Applying similar derivations from (60) to (62) yields
lim
P→∞
R2d
log(P )
= dim{span(H22W)/span(H21V)}, (64)
lim
P→∞
Re
log(P )
= dim{span(G1V)/span(G2W)}. (65)
Substituting (63)-(65) into (11), we arrive at (12a) and (12b).
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF Proposition 3
By definition, we have D¯ ⊂ D. Thus, the boundary of D¯
is included by that of D. In the following, we show that for
any given precoding matrices (V,W) ∈ I, we can always
find another precoding matrices (V′,W′) ∈ I¯, which satisfy
d1s(V,W) ≤ d1s(V′,W′) and d2s(V,W) ≤ d2s(V′,W′). So,
the boundary of D is included by that of D¯. Concluding, the
outer boundary of D is the same as that of D¯.
Before proceeding, we first introduce two critical properties
on matrix that will be used in the following analyses. That is,
for any given matrices A and B, if B is invertible, then
span(A) = span(AB), (66)
rank{A} = rank{AB}. (67)
In what follows, based on the GSVD decomposition
of (H12W,H11V) we first construct a precoding ma-
trix pair (Vˆ,Wˆ), which excludes the intersection sub-
space of span(H12W) and span(H11V) without decreasing
the achieved S.D.o.F. pair. Further, based on the GSVD
decomposition of (G2Wˆ,G1Vˆ) we construct a precod-
ing matrix pair (V′,W′), which excludes the subspace
span(G21Vˆ)/span(G22Wˆ) without decreasing the achieved
S.D.o.F. pair. In this way, we finish the construction of the
wanted precoding matrix pair.
Consider the decomposition
GSVD(H12W,H11V;N
1
d ,Kw,Kv)
= (Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, Λˆ1, Λˆ2, Xˆ, kˆ, rˆ, sˆ, pˆ). (68)
Let Ψˆ02 = [Ψˆ21, Ψˆ23]. Since Ψˆ1 and Ψˆ2 are invertible,
Ψˆ′1 = [Ψˆ11, Ψˆ13, Ψˆ12] and Ψˆ′2 = [Ψˆ02, Ψˆ22] are also invert-
ible. Applying (66) and (67), we have
d1s(V,W) = d
1
s(VΨˆ
′
2,WΨˆ
′
1) (69a)
= rank{H11VΨˆ02} −m(VΨˆ′2,WΨˆ′1) (69b)
≤ rank{H11VΨˆ02} −m(VΨˆ02,WΨˆ′1), (69c)
in which (69b) can be justified with span(H12WΨˆ′1) ∩
span(H11VΨˆ
′
2) = span(H11VΨˆ22). Besides, (69c) comes
from the fact that m(VΨˆ′2,WΨˆ′1) ≥ m(VΨˆ02,WΨˆ′1). Here
(VΨˆ02,WΨˆ
′
1) is the precoding matrix pair (Vˆ,Wˆ) we men-
tioned in the above text.
Consider the decomposition
GSVD(G2WΨˆ
′
1,G1VΨˆ
0
2;Ne,Kw,Kv − sˆ)
= (Ψ˘1, Ψ˘2, Λ˘1, Λ˘2, X˘, k˘, r˘, s˘, p˘). (70)
Let Ψ˘12 = [Ψ˘21, Ψ˘22]. Since Ψ˘1 and Ψ˘2 are invertible,
Ψ˘′1 = [Ψ˘13, Ψ˘11, Ψ˘12] and Ψ˘′2 = [Ψ˘23, Ψ˘12] are also invert-
ible. Applying (66) and (67), we have
rank{H11VΨˆ02} −m(VΨˆ02,WΨˆ′1)
= rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2} −m(VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2,WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1) (71a)
= rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2} − rank{Ψ˘23} (71b)
≤ rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘12}. (71c)
Here, since span(G1VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2)/span(G2WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1) =
span(G1VΨˆ
0
2Ψ˘23) = rank{Ψ˘23}, we see that (71b)
holds true. Since rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘23} ≤ rank{Ψ˘23}
and rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘′2} ≤ rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘12} +
rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘23}, we see that (71c) holds true.
Combining (69a)-(69c) with (71a)-(71c), we arrive at
d1s(V,W) ≤ rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘12}. (72)
On the other hand, according to (70), it holds that
m(VΨˆ02Ψ˘
1
2,WΨˆ
′
1Ψ˘
′
1) = 0, which indicates
span(G1VΨˆ
0
2Ψ˘
1
2) ⊂ span(G2WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1). (73)
According to (68), span(H12WΨˆ′1) ∩ span(H11VΨˆ02) = 0,
which together with span(H12WΨˆ′1) = span(H12WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1)
and span(H11VΨˆ02) ⊃ span(H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘12), implies
span(H12WΨˆ
′
1Ψ˘
′
1) ∩ span(H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘12) = 0. (74)
Combining (73) and (74), we arrive at
(VΨˆ02Ψ˘
1
2,WΨˆ
′
1Ψ˘
′
1) ∈ I¯. (75)
Let V′ = VΨˆ02Ψ˘12 and W′ = WΨˆ′1Ψ˘′1. According
to Corollary 2, d1s(V′,W′) = rank{H11VΨˆ02Ψ˘12}, which
together with (72), gives d1s(V,W) ≤ d1s(V′,W′). Be-
sides, span(H21V′) ⊂ span(H21V) and span(H22W′) =
span(H22W). So d2s(V,W) ≤ d2s(V′,W′). This completes
the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF Corollary 1
Since by definition Iˆ ⊂ I¯, it holds that Dˆ ⊂ D¯. In the
sequel, we will show that for any given (V,W) ∈ I¯, we
can always construct another feasible point (V⋆,W⋆) ∈ Iˆ,
which satisfy d1s(V⋆,W⋆) = d1s(V,W) and d2s(V⋆,W⋆) =
d2s(V,W), thus giving the proof of Dˆ ⊃ D¯. Concluding, it
holds that D¯ = Dˆ.
For any given (V,W) ∈ I¯, V ∈ CN1s×Kv , W ∈ CN2s×Kw ,
we should have (V,W) ∈ I¯1 and (V,W) ∈ I¯2. Since all
channel matrices are assumed to be full rank, it holds that
rank{G2W} = min{Kw, Ne}.
In the following, we consider two distinct cases.
(i) For the case of Kw ≥ Ne, it holds that rank{G2W} =
Ne. Denote G2W = [U1 U0]
[
Σ1 0
0 0
] [
TH1
TH0
]
as the
SVD of G2W. Then, the matrix G2WT1 is invertible. Let
B = T1(G2WT1)
−1G1V. Then,
G1V =G2WT1(G2WT1)
−1G1V = G2WB. (76)
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(ii) For the case of Kw < Ne, G2W is full column rank.
Let P be the projection matrix of G2W, i.e.,
P =G2W((G2W)
HG2W)
−1(G2W)
H . (77)
Due to (V,W) ∈ I¯1, it holds that
G1V = PG1V. (78)
Substituting (77) into (78) and letting B =
((G2W)
HG2W)
−1(G2W)
HG1V, we arrive at
G1V =G2WB. (79)
Let V⋆ = V and W⋆ = W[B B⊥]. Summarizing the
above two cases, for both cases it holds that
G1V
⋆ = G2W
⋆(:, 1 : Kv),
which, combined with (V,W) ∈ I¯2, implies that (V⋆,W⋆) ∈
Iˆ. On the other hand, since the matrix [B B⊥] is invertible,
it holds that d1s(V⋆,W⋆) = d1s(V,W) and d2s(V⋆,W⋆) =
d2s(V,W). This completes the proof.
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